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Exploiting experiences accumulated during MPEG-4 
Structured Audio [1] [5] process of standardization and 
OCCAMM [2] European project related to multimedia 
content protection, this paper proposes a new approach to 
Intellectual Property Management and Protection (IPMP) 
of multimedia content streams. 
The definition of a sort of C-like language for IPMP 
tools description is proposed. The core of such language 
shall be a set of IPMP-primitives able to be combined and 
provide all the range of functionality required during 
content consumption. The suggested approach will also 
allow an implementation independent method of 
complexity evaluation. Moreover, a sort of IPMP Scene 
Description Language is here suggested as a suitable 
solution for the formalization of interactions between 
different IPMP tools cooperating during the process of 
content consumption.  
The potential effectiveness of the above-mentioned 
structured approach has been recognized by the MPEG 
working group through the addition in the current IPMP 
Extensions Committee Draft of the opportunity for a 




With the deployment of digital technology to deliver 
digital multimedia material to users a host of issues have 
surfaced, arising from the fact that audio-visual 
information have always carried intrinsic value but 
because of the poor performance of analogue media and 
their rapid deterioration in subsequent processing/copying, 
the protection of this value has in general not been an 
issue. With digital broadcasting (via satellite, Internet or 
terrestrial carriers) the traditional paradigm no longer 
holds because audio-visual content in its digital form has 
the ability to allow infinite replication without loss of 
quality. Content protection has therefore become a major 
issue. On the one hand content has to be protected so that 
access to it is enabled only to those who have acquired the 
right to do so, on the other hand content is to be protected 
so as to prevent its dissemination. 
 Further, the flexibility of digital technologies allows a 
major overhaul of the way content is accessed today. 
While today the economic models that can be used still 
suffer from the rigidity of analogue technologies and the 
reference to physical support media, the Internet provides 
almost limitless business models. This is reflected in the 
objective of many IPMP initiatives to provide value-chain 
participants with the ability to acquire, supply, process and 
consume multi-media services on a worldwide basis in 
accordance with the rights associated with these services. 
In other words content protection is to be extended to 
encompass "content management". 
In this scenario interoperability among different 
manufacturers’ products is of crucial importance to 
provide consumers the easiest accessibility to content. 
Two kinds of interoperability can be defined and in 
this paper will be shown that the proposed solution can 
provide both: 
1. Allow the same protected content to be consumed on 
different vendors’ devices.  
2. Allow the same content to be protected by different 
vendors’ IPMP tools.  
 
2. TOOLS DESCRIPTION 
 
Following the success of MPEG-4 Structured Audio 
Orchestra Language (SAOL) [1] [4] [7] [8], conceived and 
currently used to describe instruments as a network of 
primitives producing the desired sound synthesis or 
processing, we propose to define a set of IPMP-primitives 
able to be combined and provide all the range of functions 
required during content consumption. For instance such 
primitives shall be able to provide functionality needed 
when performing cryptographic algorithms. In case of 
symmetric encryption/decryption, a DES algorithm would 
be described in terms of a sequence of primitives 
constituting the analog of a SA instrument (that henceforth 
will be called either IPMP instrument) receiving the 




(text)   
Parser/  
Compiler  
(exe)   








Figure 1. Tool description parsing, compiling and download 
into the terminal. 
Every IPMP tool would be described through this 
language either as a single IPMP instrument or as a set of 
instruments composing an IPMP orchestra. The 
description would be parsed and compiled by suitable 
parsers and compilers whose output shall be a bytecode to 
be downloaded into the recipient terminal where an IPMP 
virtual machine will be able to instantiate and use the tool 
(see figure 1). We use here the term virtual machine since 
it is a platform-dependent executable able to execute a 
platform-independent (byte)code.  
An exact specification of primitives’ implementation 
is not necessary. Only their input-output relation is 
required to be standardized in order to allow different 
developers to exchange IPMP tools without risk of 
incompatibility. This implies that a given description of an 
IPMP instrument shall correspond to a unique bytecode. 
The ability to describe IPMP tools in terms of sets of 
basic primitives to be executed a certain number of times 
during tool use will provide an implementation 
independent method of complexity evaluation. In order to 
achieve meaningful measurements a complexity vector 
(i.e. a set of basic primitives or classes of primitives) shall 
be defined. Every element of this vector will be a counter 
of the number of times a primitive (or primitives belonging 
to a class of primitives) is used during the IPMP tool 
execution. The final complexity will be quantified through 
the values of the different vector dimensions. 
 
3. TOOLS INTERACTION 
 
In case the multimedia content consumption requires the 
use and interaction of different IPMP tools coming from 
different vendors, they are likely to be described by 
different IPMP orchestras. The authors propose that the 
way in which every tool has to cooperate with the others 
has to be specified by means of an IPMP Scene 
Description Language similar to MPEG-4 Binary Format 
for Scene (BIFS) [3]. The scene description shall be coded 
independently from streams related to primitive media 
objects so that it will not be necessary to decode the 
objects in order to access and if necessary modify 
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 Figure 2 A process of content consumption may require several 
interoperating IPMP tools. 
Here the different IPMP tools will play the role of 
BIFS nodes and their relationship will be described in 
terms of a hierarchical structure. Each node is linked to 
one or several other nodes in a non-static way. This means 
that node attributes can be changed while nodes can be 
added, replaced, or removed. This scenario introduces the 
need for a normative entity able to coordinate the different 
IPMP tool instances running inside the virtual machine. 
OPIMA architecture approach investigated in the 
framework of OCCAMM European project seems to be 
suitable to offer a platform to conceive this normative 
entity. Actually this architecture appears as the best 
candidate to interpret and execute languages oriented to 
secure multimedia content handling. Some modifications 
are likely to result unavoidable in order to best fit the set 
of primitives that will be defined and thus provide the 
maximum degree of effectiveness. 
As for tools description, scene description has to be 
parsed and compiled in order to produce the bytecode to 
be downloaded into the terminal and allowing a correct 
synergy among the several IPMP tools instances. The 
exact specification of this parser and compiler shall be 
given only in terms of input-output relation (a given 
description corresponds to a given bytecode). Such a 
description shall be downloaded into the terminal with the 
content since the content vendor will have to specify (in 
terms of IPMP scene description language) the exact 
IPMP environment in which its material has to be 
consumed. A schematic of this scenario is proposed in 
figure 2. 
 
4. TOOLS CONFIGURATION 
 
Once an IPMP instrument has been described in its 
functionality and placed at its own place inside the scene, 
it has to be configured and used in the right way. This goal 
can be achieved by means of score language providing 
information concerning basically: 
• exact time in which a particular IPMP instrument has 
to be instantiated, 
• duration of its performance (or exact time in which it 
has to be terminated), 
• parameters for initialization. 
 
For instance, if a process of content consumption 
requires the interaction with a remote IPMP tool, we can 
imagine that through a score event an IPMP instrument is 
properly instantiated and configured. Then it produces the 
appropriate message to be sent and stops. The remote tool, 
once the message is received, produces the answer and a 
score event aimed at activating the IPMP instrument 
instance recipient of the message. This provides an 
asynchronous mechanism of IPMP tool interaction. 
By means of this score language it will also be 
possible to access some control variables inside the 
different IPMP instruments if they have been declared as 
exposed (i.e. accessible for modification) in the 
description. This feature will provide a powerful run-time 
tuning mechanism.  
A score is a list of commands. A command performs a 
single action at a moment in time, such as changing the 
value of an exposed field or creating a new instance of an 
IPMP instrument (providing the set-up settings). The 
instantiation of new IPMP tools only requires that the 
bytecode related to the new tool description has already 
been downloaded into the terminal. 
 
5. AN EXAMPLE OF TOOL DESCRIPTION 
 
A very simple example is here provided in order to better 
illustrate the idea of IPMP tools description. 
 The described tool performs a classic digital signature 
generation and verification algorithm. In bold are 
functions that could belong to the primitive instructions set 
to be defined. 
It is the Digital Signature Algorithm taken from [6] 
where the necessary keys are generated and then used to 
sign the document and verify its signature. 
The example shows that typical primitives that are 
likely to be inserted into the core set of functions are 
operations modulo a generic integer n (exp_mod, 
invert_mod, mult_mod), operations on great numbers 
(long_modulus), basic cryptographic functions 
(SecureHashAlgorithm) and complex mathematical 
operations (select_from_multiplicative_group). The study 
and analysis of the widest range of currently used 
algorithms will assure the core primitives set to cover the 
largest variety of usage scenarios. 
 
// SUMMARY: entity A signs a binary message m of arbitrary length. Any entity B can 
verify this  




bit(160)  q, a; 
bit(1024) p, g, alpha, y; 
uint  t, k, h; 
 
// Key generation for the DSA 
 
 alpha = 1; 
  
// Select a prime number  q such that 2159 < q < 2160 . 
 
while(!is_prime(q)) 
  q = select_random_pow2(159, 160); 
 
// Choose t so that 0 = t = 8, and select a prime number p where 2511+64*t < p < 
2512+64*t ,  
// with the property that q divides (p-1). 
while(long_modulus((p-1), q)){ 
  t = select_random(0,8); 
 k = 64 * t; 
 p = select_random_pow2(511 + k, 512 + k); 
} 
 
// Select a generator α of the unique cyclic group of order q in Zq* 
// Select an element g?Zq* and compute α = g(p-1)/q mod p. 
while(alpha == 1){ 
g = select_from_multiplicative_group(p); 
h = long_divide((p-1), q); 
alpha = exp_mod(g, h, p); 
} 
   
 // Select a random integer a such that  1 = a = (q – 1) 
 
a = select_random(1, (q - 1)); 
  
 // Compute y = αa mod p 
 
y = exp_mod(alpha, a, p); 
 
// A’s public key is (p, q, alpha, y); A’s private key is a. 
 output(p, q, alpha, y, a);  
 
DSASignatureGeneration(p, q, alpha, y, m, a){ 
 
// Entity A should do the following: 
 
bit(160) k, invk, s, r; 
bit(1024) h; 
 
// Select a random secret integer k, 0 < k < q 
 
while((k == 0) OR (k == q)) 
k = select_random(0, q); 
 
// Compute r = (αk mod p) mod q 
 
h = exp_mod(alpha, k, p); 
r = long_modulus(h, q); 
 
// Compute k-1mod q. 
 
invk = invert_mod(k, q); 
 
// Compute s = (k-1 mod q) * {h(m) + a * r} mod q. 
 
hash_code = SecureHashAlgorithm(m); 
s = long_modulus(invk * (hash_code + a *r), q); 
 





DSASignatureVerification(p, q, alpha, y, r, s, m){ 
 
bit(160)  w, u1, u2, v, hash_code; 
bit(1024) k, j; 
 
// To verify A’s signature (r, s) on m, B should do the following: 
 
// Obtain A’s authentic public key (p, q, alpha, y). 
// Verify that 0 < r < q and 0 < s < q; if not then reject the signature. 
 
if (!((0 < r < q) AND (0 < s < q)) output (FALSE); 
 
else{ 
 // Compute w = (s-1 mod q) and h(m) 
 w = invert_mod(s, q); 
 hash_code = SecureHashAlgorithm(m); 
 
 // Compute u1 = w * h(m)mod q and u2 = (r * w) mod q 
 u1 = long_modulus(w * hash_code, q); 
 u2 = long_modulus(r * w, q); 
 
 // Compute v = (αu1 * yu2 mod p) mod q. 
 k = exp_mod(alpha, u1, p); 
 j = exp_mod(y, u2, p); 
 v = mult_mod(k, j, q); 
 
 // Accept signature if and only if v=r. 
 if(v == r) ouput(TRUE); 
 else output(FALSE); 
}  
Figure 3 Example of Digital Signature Algorithm described 




According to past experience in SA [4] [7] [8], the 
proposed approach provides a consistent number of 
advantages that we try here to summarize. 
 
The tool description in terms of network of primitives 
 
1. allows a range of possible tools creation as wide as 
the definition of the base primitives set is appropriate; 
2. provides a simple way to redesign IPMP tools when 
they should become no more trustworthy for 
implementation bugs or algorithm intrinsic 
weaknesses; 
3. does not need the sensible content to exit the terminal 
since the only data transfer involved is that 
concerning the bytecode download (on the other hand 
this shall be encrypted, but the amount of data is 
likely to be quite small); 
4. allows a precise complexity evaluation in terms of 
number of basic instruction to be performed per time-
frame and thus implementation independent. These 
complexity measurements could lead to a precise 
definition of levels and profiles. 
 
The scene description in terms of dedicated language 
 
1. provides a simple way to reconfigure the interaction 
between different IPMP tools even during the content 
consumption; 
2. if coded in textual format and downloaded as 
bytecode, requires a low bit-rate data exchange with 
the terminal, keeping any sensible information inside 
it; 
3. implies the definition of a normative scheduler 
supervising the overall execution, allowing the 
exploitation of efforts already produced in the 
framework of successful past projects [2]. 
 
The tool configuration by means of a dedicated score 
language 
 
1. allows the run-time instantiation of new IPMP tools 
through events generation; 
2. is suitable for a fine and direct control on IPMP tools 
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